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Article 6

Book Reviews

Edmund Burke's Aesthetic Ideology: Language, Gender and Political Economy in
Revolution by Tom Furniss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Pp. xiv + 306. $59.95.
Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics and the Reconstruction of Art edited by Paul Mattick, Jr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. vii + 256. $49.95.

At one point in the introductory essay in which Paul Mattick, Jr. describes
the essays in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics and the Reconstruction of Art, he
identifies the central view that unites the several contributors to the volume.
"The authors," he writes, "work with a variety of analytic and historical
methods ... but all rest on the conviction that aesthetic ideas, of the present
as well as the past, can be fully understood when seen not only in relation to
intellectual and other social contexts but as themselves constructed in history" (3). This is a promising enough beginning, particularly insofar as it opens
on a number of views that have corne to dominate discussions of aesthetics
in the last quarter century. For Mattick's affirmation of the importance of
history echoes the influential view that aesthetics and history have been, until recently, treated as if they were opposed to one another. Whether aesthetics has been seen as an effort to talk about the "timeless" (what is ahlstorical
by virtue of persisting throughout history) or whether it has been seen as an
effort to deny the Significance of one's material circumstances, it has, almost
invariably, been described as in some kind of opposition to history.
Mattick operates under the assumption that the opposition~or, more precisely, the antagonism~between aesthetics and history represents an historical deficiency in aesthetics (as in philosophy generally), and his introduction
presents various strategies for dosing aesthetics accordingly. The first of
these is the injunction to consider that history itself has changed: "only during the last several hundred years" has "the idea gained ground that history
is marked by discontinuities as well as continuities" (1). For Mattick, this
seems to mean that the appearance of the idea of discontinuity is, in the first
place, itself an historical phenomenon and, in the second, a repudiation of
the notion that there are fixed sets of arguments and alternatives~" a cycling
through a set of constant alternatives" (1). Yet after having introduced these
plausible views, he proceeds to unpack them in less plausible ways. For instance, repudiating cycles is for him tantamount to discarding the project of
constructing intellectual equivalences (between the savage and the civilized,
as in Levi-Strauss's work; between the classical and the modern, as in Bernard Williams's Shame and Necessity, in which Williams renewed the claim of
structuralist anthropology to discovery justifiable and recognizable ethical
views rather than the mere otherness of superstition in earlier cultures).
The historicity of the idea of discontinuity is easy enough for Mattick to
establish; it came into being with the "social transformation" effected by "the
development of the capitalist mode of production" (1). What is somewhat
more difficult to see is why the fact that history can come to be perceived as
involving discontinuity~that is, change~should come to mean that the notion of history ought to be seen to be identical only with the notion of discontinuity. Yet it turns out that the emergence of the idea of discontinuity in
history both makes the idea of a world-historical survey of aesthetics absurd,
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in Mattick's view, and raises a question about whether he would take it to
be possible actually to write a history.
From the standpoint of his insistence upon historical discontinuity, he can
point to a fine irony in the surveys that we have taken to be histories of aesthetics: that modern aestheticians discover "the beginning of their discipline
in the mid-1700s" but that they "almost invariably" accompany that recognition with "the identification of an earlier origin in classical Greece" (3). For
Mattick such a move involves a conspicuous lack of self-consciousness, an
inability, in the moment one is announcing the sempiternal continuity of aesthetics, to keep track of the fact that one had, only a moment before, announced its emergence. He instances, in support of his view that one should
not press transhistorical resemblances too hard, Marx's objection to conflating similarity of materials and means of labor with similarity of conceptions.
Marx, ridiculing political economists who imagine that "the Kirghiz who
cuts down rushes with a knife he has stolen from a Russian so as to weave
them together to make a canoe is just as true a capitalist as Herr von Rothschild," had crowed that he "could prove with equal facility that the Greeks
and Romans celebrated communion because they drank wine and ate breadf
and that the Turks sprinkle themselves daily with holy water like Catholics
because they wash themselves daily" (8). Yet while Marx seems primarily to
be attacking vulgar materialism (in the form of the view that apparently similar materials and means of labor must involve similar intentions)f Mattick
seems to press the position rather harder, as if to suggest that it would be
wrong for a native speaker of any languagef for instance, to reclassify his
earlier speech as a series of instances of prose.
His critique of the "eighteenth-century reclassification of the activities and
objects that now form the fine arts" thus amounts to a rejection of the notion
that there are certain basic questions about fictitious representation that now
look like a kind of pre-history of aesthetics as we have come to know it since
the eighteenth century. The double move of saying that people came to discuss aesthetics in the eighteenth century and that Plato, for instance, had
posed substantial questions about the relationship between fictions and reason must come, for him, to look like a basic mistake. It seems to emphasize
the truth of issues at the expense of the particular means that get at and constitute that truth (as if there were an aesthetic "character previously obscured" [6]); and properly historical consciousness, he argues, ought to be
the repudiation of all such efforts at equivalence.
Yet if he first suggested that it was simply mistaken to act as if Plato were
really talking about the same things as Addison, he begins to waffle on this
issue. If twentieth-century commentators make this mistake, they aref as he
recognizes very clearly, at least authorized by example. The history of aesthetics itself-not merely for modern aestheticians talking about the history
of their field but also for the eighteenth-century writers on art and beauty
whom we are historicizing-continual1y belies a basic commihnent to the
Similarity or continuity of their discussion to that of the ancients. As Mattick
appreciates, they saw themselves as "continuing a form of discourse practiced by the ancients, as evidenced in their constant reference to the writings
of Plato, Aristotle, Horce, Cicero, Quintilian, Pliny, and the supposed Longinus" (6). And it is this belief that obviously complicates what had, a moment
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ago, seemed to be the patent absurdity of making things mean in the present
by alienating them from their historical circumstances.
There is, of course, the larger question of whether and why we should
want history at all if it never seemed recognizable as anything that might resemble part of our own experience. But leaving that question aside, there is
the rather Simpler matter of explicating the passage from Marx that Mattick
instances. While Mattick presents Marx as saying that cross-cultural and
transhistorical generalizations are absurd, it would appear that Marx's claim
is rather less sweeping. If Turks don't become Catholics by washing themselves, his point is surely that physical resemblance betvveen two actions is
less important than the kinds of intention one could bring to it. No Turk at
his toilet is, on Marx's account, likely to be, say, a leading candidate to become pope, because neither he nor anyone else would see his washing himself as involving the capacity for any of the other actions that would make
him a contender for that office. But, unless the brevity of an introduction
misrepresents his position entirely, Mattick inclines towards disrupting not
only the resemblance between bathing Turks and self-anOinting Catholics
but also the resemblance between early and late Catholics, who, though separated from one another by a great deal, are presumably sometimes united
in their ways of deploying water.
The difficulty is not in Mattick's primary aim, which is the admirable one
of eschewing presentist and progressivist accounts of history, but rather in
his sense of how-and how thoroughly-one must react against the temptations against presentism and progreSSivism. On the one hand, it is very easy
to imagine that, if the notion of a publicity effect means anything, it crucially
applies to the relationship between the present and the past, and to the fact
that what feels like present actuality renews its recommendations much
more readily than any represented past can do. Yet because Mattick is so
alert to the mistakermess of privileging our own ways of constructing things
now, he imagines that he needs to find a way of equalizing the competition
between the past and the present and must therefore level the playing field
by emphasizing discourse (as opposed to "a focus on self-conscious theory")
(12). Rejecting Foucault's account of "discursive formations" because
"neither he nor anyone else has actually tried to define the set of rules required to specify such a formation for any cognitive domain" (11), Mattick
puts forward in preference J. G. A. Pocock's account, which represents discourse less as self-conscious theory than as '''the great variety of things that
could be said or seen to have been said, and upon the diversity of linguistic
contexts that went to determine what could be said but were at the same
time acted upon by what was said'" (12). Except for its restriction to the
written word, Pocock's account of discourse may sound suspiciously akin to
Foucault's, in that both are committed to suggesting the way in which representations are not simply assertions of meaning but recommendations as
well (and in that both have been taken as suggesting that there is a Simple
determinism at work in the linguistic and social forms of an age). And it is
that aspect of the notion of discourse-its attention to the fact that every
statement or theme or question also lays itself down as a partial context for
subsequent statements, themes, and questions-that we can see Foucault
getting at when he is concerned with the significance of architecture and a
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variety of word-based and non-ward-based technologies that influence behavior, or that we can see Pocock reaching for when he is concerned with
how '''each language context betokens a political, social, or historical context
within which it is itself situated ... [and how] each language to some degree
selects and prescribes the context within which it is to be recognized'" (12).
For Mattick, discourse seems particularly important for suggesting an historical record that is describable not simply as the record of individual views
("a focus on self-conscious theory" [12]) nor as an expression of what Hazlitt
called the spirit of the age. That is, discourse, on the aCcolUlt implicit here,
seems to revolve around the ways in which "a variety of contexts" may influence one another, or, as Mattick puts it, are "capable both of cooperating
and of interfering with each other in various ways" (12). The question of
how one recognizes a context (a question that had appeared to have a certain
urgency in relation to Foucault) thus does not so much get answered as resolved into a linguistic materialism that is a sophisticated variant on the
crude materialism that Marx had lampooned in portraying the absurdity of
taking a washing Turk for a self-anointing Christian. And if Mattick had
seemed to view a text as importantly bound up with context, he drops that
issue to discuss deviations from this inchoate notion; he moves on to describe both "textual migrations" (13), movements in which texts leave the local contexts in which they arose and transport themselves to others (the kind
of thing that once occupied influence studies and publication histories), and
what we might call "contextual migrations/' movements in which "picturesque travel accounts," for example, "are linked with Sir Joshua Reynolds's
Academy lectures, Locke's theory of property, and Smith's moral theory" (as
in Elizabeth Bohls' essay in the volume [12]).
If the particularity of context once seemed like the justification for an historicism that would be the antidote to presentism, that is, textual migration
and contextual migration seem instead to argue the case for a principled alienation. In other words, the notion of context ceases to involve the project of
nZirrowing the field of interpretative probabilities to what someone like
Marx's Turk probably does and does not mean with his washing; it is instcad an expansive notion in which the association between one context and
<mother may clearly exceed what any individual speaker was capable of
meaning by it.
The discursive solution thus seems like a peculiar antidote to the hazards
of presentism, in as much as it would appear to perform the same job of alienation that presentism does; and in fact the introduction proceeds to return
to a version of the presentism that it had eschevved. For the present, it
emerges, has derived from history all along: "we stand as present-day commentators on the post within a discourse formed in art by elcments of that
past, and to which we must therefore take a reflexive and critical stance"
(15). fvlorcO\'cr, hc claims, "the discourse studied here is one in which the
writcrs of these essays arc implicatcd" (15). The "rcflexive and critical
stJnce" therefore comes to lie in the recognition that there is no "reflexive
,md critic.JI stancc" a\'<1i1ablc, since present discourses depend upon pilst discnursl's-indccd, Me incre.Jsingly indistinguishilble from past discourses.
Thl' introduction comes around, in other words, to rejecting the view that
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the past is continuous with the present by affirming that the present is continuous with the past.
Reassuring as it may be to hear that there is "no conflict in principle between historical accuracy and relevance to current social and so intellectual
concerns" (16), there is something puzzling as well in this formulation. For if
the project of the volume seemed initially to involve showing how "art as
we know it-the system of 'fine arts'-is largely peculiar to modern society,"
that project seemed to suggest that real historical accuracy would eliminate
such relevance; if writers in the historical past didn't mean the same thing
we mean by similar activities, how can an historical account that exposes
that difference in meaning imagine that those different meanings are relevant to our views? The problem of relevance has, I suspect, surfaced in large
measure because the history that was supposed to rescue us from aestheticism has come to sound increasingly similar to it. The quandary is this:
Bourdieu's accotmt of aesthetics as "an ethos of elective distance from the
necessities of the natural and social world" informs several of the essays included here; that account carries with it a critique of high formalism and
aesthetics that sees them as enacting and endorsing the notion of elective
distance, the proposition that natural and social conditions fall with varying
degrees of force on various different people and that modern aesthetic experience is one way of continuing that differential impact; and yet the historical
account that recognized the full extent of the difference between earlier accounts and our own would itself clearly enact elective distance just as forcibly. The difference between distance by way of imagination and distance by
way of history does not, that is, seem particularly compelling.
I have dwelt this long upon Mattick's brief introduction, first, because the
timeliness of the volume revolves around the sense of urgency that has recently attached to historicizing work and, second, because I think that we
need better reasons for that urgency than the appeal to the reality of the discourse (13) and to the relevance of historical accuracy. Indeed, the volume itself presents essays with a variety of kinds of implicit argument for the relevance of history. Jeffrey Barnouw's "The beginnings of 'aesthetics' and the
Leibnizian conception of sensation" offers an account of Leibniz's discussion
of subliminal or marginal awareness as a "confused" mode of representation
and suggests the work it did as a context for the writing of Baumgarten and
other participants in eighteenth-century aesthetic discussions; the clear implication of his practice is that an historical account helps us to understand
the writings of early aestheticians better than we could by simply reading off
the words on the page. And while Barnouw confines his discussions to the
question of how Leibniz and his arguments might have served as a recommendation to other writers, other contributors-notably Bohls, Shusterman,
Mattick, and Woodmansee--emphasize the uses of art to express social and
economic motives and see historical research as partially aimed at countering the recommendations that are plausibly involved in any description of
action. If Woodmansee, for example, would emphasize that Addison was
addressing bankers looking to fill their new-found leisure, a principal stress
in her discussion falls on the notion that we should not do as they do, should
not take their actions and the objects and texts that represent them as precedents for our own.
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Torn Furniss's Edmund Burke's Aesthetic Ideology: Language, Gender and Political Economy in Revolution, like Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics and the Reconstruction of Art, examines the interconnections between aesthetics and history, or aesthetics and politics. Furniss offers a detailed account of Burke
through readings of A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the
Sublime and Beautiful (1757) and Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790)
that reach well beyond those texts to a variety of writings by Burke's contemporaries. He is, in particular, preoccupied with a problem that has long
troubled commentators on Burke-that the political positions that Burke
sketches in his primarily aesthetic writing seem to contradict those of his
later political writing. This contradiction has produced a variety of explanations, including Isaac Krarnnick's account of Burke's conflicted "bourgeois
identity" and C. B. Macpherson's argument that there was no real contradiction because the traditional order was already capitalist. Furniss's own interest, however, is to "move away from such author-centred models of reading
and textual production in order to see Burke's texts as a weave of discourses
which intersect with a range of interrelated writings in the eighteenth century" (7).
Furniss treats a number of subjects that have figured prominently in Burke
scholarship in recent years-Burke's account of the sublime, his view of language, the account of gender that emerges from his work, and his views of
the place of custom and revolution, and he does so with assurance and intelligence. Indeed, his book stands as eloquent testimony to the usefulness that
deconstructive criticism can have for an intelligent critic and to the aptness
of the fit between some deconstructive concerns and Burke's own commitments. Although Burke's Aesthetic Ideology is shaped in part by exclusions
that many historians will doubtless regret, Furniss's intense readings of the
Enquiry and the Reflections attempt to emphasize the concerns that bind these
texts to one another. (However much is added by the discussions of Richard
Price, Thomas Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft and others, the focus on these two
key Burke texts is crucial to the organization of the book.) A standard historical overview might well talk about Burke's personal views at the various
stages of his life, might simply discuss the changes in his views over the
more than thirty years that separates the two works, or might even suggest
that, being about two very different subjects, tl,e two were largely uruelated.
Furniss, however, is interested (in a perfectly reasonable version of deconstructive practice) in stressing the two texts' relationship to one another, because that gives him a way of talking about how the two texts constitute between them something like a sustained irony, in which the same words now
seem to be used for very different effect from that of their first occurrence. In
its less compelling version, this amounts to noting a resemblance between
terms that have had drastically different valences attached to them: thus, he
argues that "the sublime seems potentially reactionary and revolutionary at
one and the same time" (120). This discovery may seem less surprising than
predictable (in so far as it is an obvious byproduct of a critical practice that
both aligns dissimilar texts to emphasize their Similarity and also identifies
the dissimilarities in apparent resemblance). ill its more compelling version,
however, Furniss's book provides a enormously acute-and indispensableinsight into Burke and his achievement. For what Furniss has accomplished
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is to present the most sustained account I know of Burke's importance as an
early analyst and practitioner of the art of recommendation and of its dual
affinities with aesthetics and politics.
The Johns Hopkins University

Frances Ferguson

History, Gender and Eighteenth-Century Literature, edited by Beth Fowkes Tobin. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994. Pp. vii + 309. $50.00.
Alexander Pope and his Eighteenth-Century Women Readers by Claudia N.
Thomas. Carbondale and Edwardswille: Southern Illinois University Press,
1994. Pp. xii + 309. $39.95.

In the past ten or fifteen years, the study of eighteenth-century British lit-erature and culture has been invigorated by a new attention to the relation
between gender roles and cultural authority; both of the books under consideration make valuable contributions to this trend in criticism, albeit in different ways. The majority of the essays in the collection edited by Beth Fowkes
Tobin clearly see themselves as pursuing the fruitful line of inquiry into the
domestic sphere initiated by the literary critics Nancy Armstrong and Mary
Poovey and the historians Catherine Hall and Lenore Davidoff; they are concerned with evaluating the rise of women's moral authority during the eighteenth century, and with the growing importance of private, affective relationships for men and women alike. Methodologically, the essays in the Tobin volume take the inclusion of "History" in its title seriously; they by no
means confine themselves to the analysis of literary texts. In contrast, Claudia Thomas's study of women writers' responses to Pope restricts its focus to
female engagement with published literature. Like many of the essays in the
Tobin collection, it is interested in disproving the notion that women in eighteenth-century Britain were the passive victims of patriarchal authority;
however, it refutes this notion not through reference to the other forms of
cultural authority women might exert, but through detailed analysis of the
kinds of critical acuity women readers and writers brought to bear on the
documents of male-dominated literary culture available to them.
According to Beth Fowkes Tobin's introduction, History, Gender and Eighteenth-Century Literature aims to contribute both to women's studies, and to
the more general field of gender studies. Admirably, several of the essays do
expand the rubric of gender studies to include the construction of masculinity during the period, including Tobin's own excellent study of Arthur
Young's writings and the creation of the profession of estate manager, and
Shawn Lisa Maurer's fascinating discussion of filial relations in early periodicals. The volume also argues against a feminist essentialism; instead it seeks
to "encourage feminists to turn to history and culture in their analyses of literary texts" (1) and number of the essays inflect their discussions of gender
roles with attention to pertinent social contexts. Susan Staves's article on
"Fielding and the Comedy of Attempted Rape" continues her ground-breaking work on the imbrication of gender roles, legal concepts, and literary rep-
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resentation; both Maurer's piece and Beth Kowaleski-Wallace's article on
"The Body, Class, and Art in Evelina and Frances Burney's Early Diaries" delineate the complex ways that middle-class economic identity, artistic and
literary culture, and gender roles interacted during this period; Kathryn
Kirkpatrick's investigation of metaphors of property in conduct book literature provides another interesting discussion of the relationship betvveen class
identities and constructions of femininity.
On the whole, these essays seem more adept at discussing the intricacies
of English domestic culture than they do at extending those analyses to the
context of English colonialism and imperialism, Often, when they do look at
the relation between literahlre and the international arena, they rely on generalizations, rather than producing the kind of historically nuanced readings
for which the introduction seems to call. Diane Dugaw's article on Gay's sequel to the Beggar's Opera, Polly, for example, is useful for bringing this fascinating text to readers' attention, but relies heavily on an unexamined comparison between English woman and Caribbean slaves, claiming that the
play is a "satire that exposes the European heroic ideal as an ethos of slavery: an enslaving gender ideology and an enslaving will to empire that mutually construct each other" (39), Similarly, Ruth Perry's provocative comparison of four mid-eighteenth-century utopian novels ends with the proposal that "where women's claims to the life of the mind are honored and
encouraged. . it Signals a belief in human potential-across gender and
across the social dimensions of race, class and nation as well" (176), While it
seems certain that the status of white women in eighteenth-century England
was in some relation to the status of cultural others, it may be too all-encompassing to see sexual and racial oppression as two homogeneous, mutually exclusive, and thus analogous categories; such claims tend to ignore
the heterogeneity of both dynamics, caused by the presence of gender difference in the colonies, for instance, or by ethnic differences among British
women, Joseph Lew's article on "Mansfield Park and the Dynamics of Slavery" is an insightful analysis of the relation between the use of patriarchal
power in the colonies and in the domestic space, but even he relies on the
tempting, but imprecise, analogy between white English women and slaves
to ground his argument. Only Jill Campbell's article on Mary Wortley Montagu's descriptions of Turkey escapes from such generalizations, primarily
because she discusses the interaction between two distinct sets of gender
roles-English and Turkish-as well as examining the specificity of Lady
Mary's responses to cultural differences.
Finally, it needs to be said of this collection that it has a quite specific idea
of the dominant concerns of eighteenth-century England, particularly of the
latter half of this period. 111ese concerns include the reorganization of familial relationships, the structural importance of female propriety and moral
authority to social organization, and the growth of evangelicalism as a
source of feminine cultural power. While certainly not misplaced, a belief in
the pre-eminence of these issues tends to produce an alternative canon of
eighteenth-century texts, though I'm sure the contributors to this volume
have nothing so prescriptive in mind. Yet the usual suspects are there: Sarah
Scott, Fanny Burney, and two articles each on Hannah More and Jane Austen, Only two essays (on Gay and Montagu) treat subjects arguably not re-
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lated to the construction of the middle classes. Thus, while the volume
makes no claim to cover all the permutations of gender in eighteenth-century culture, it seems significant that its articles make no mention of writers
of amatory fiction in the early eighteenth-century-Haywood, Behn, or Manley-the scandalous memoirists of mid-century-Charlotte Charke, among
others-or the republican feminists of the later part of the century-Mary
Wollstonecraft, for instance, or Mary Hays. I mention this not as a criticism,
but to point out its potential implications for literary periodization. If feminist literary historians see Mansfield Park (published 1814) as an eighteenthcentury novel, but overlook novels such as The Memoirs of Emma Courtney
(published 1796), which argue against the priority of home and family in
women's lives, they may find they have renounced a male-dominated Age
of Johnson" only to find themselves constrained by the parameters of an
"Age of Domesticity."
In contrast, Claudia Thomas's book covers one subject in considerable
depth. This is an exhaustive, scrupulous investigation of the broad variety of
women readers' responses to the work of Alexander Pope throughout the
eighteenth century. She includes prose responses, as well as poetic ones, and
writers who adopted Pope's formal qualities, along with writers who expanded on his thematic concerns. After compiling this evidence, Thomas
powerfully and persuasively concludes that
If

Pope's eighteenth-century women readers suggest a model of fearless
critical reading. Few of these women identified with Pope's constructions of femininity. Instead, women appropriated and revised Pope's
images to suit their own contexts, whether more genteel, more devout,
or more feminist. Current analysis implying that contemporary women
were somehow victimized by Pope's gendered rhetoric should reconsider the critical acuity with which his female adience often read. (244)
Although one might say that Thomas thus Side-steps the potentially powerful impact of Pope's misogyny on his male readers, she nevertheless makes a
crucial feminist statement in emphasizing female intelligence and critical
agency.
Thomas provides a number of reasons why Pope would be a central figure
in the intellectual milieu of eighteenth-century women, both during his lifetime and after his death. Analyzing Pope's early translations, Thomas concludes that such work "sought and addressed women readers" (21), providing openings for them either to learn from his poetic technique, or to enter
into dialogue with his opinions. Like Valerie Rumbold in Women's Place in
Pope's World (1989), Thomas also points to Pope's own marginalization in
English culture, by virtue of his class, religion and deformity, to explain why
women readers who were his contemporaries might have found him a more
accessible ally or opponent than other writers of the time. As Pope assumed
a position of cultural authority later in the century, Thomas argues, women's
references to his work also served to legitimate their own writing. Denied
the education that allowed male writers to signal authority through classical
allusions, women turned to Pope to supply the place of the ancients.
Thomas's work rests on her exceptional scholarly labor in tracing the exact
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references to Pope's works in hundreds of relatively inaccessible texts by
women writers. One unfortunate byproduct of this comprehensiveness is
that, at times, it is difficult to follow the thread of the argument in the welter
of citations Thomas supplies. TIlis painstaking accumulation of detail, however, produces one of the major strengths of Thomas's book. She is able to
show convincingly that women writers did not hold a unitary view of Pope
or his work: indeed, they could not, since they were such a varied group
themselves. Thus, Pope provided an attractive interlocuter for such aristocratic poets as Mary Wortley Montagu and Anne Finch for different reasons
than those for which he proved a valuable model for the working-class poet
Mary Leapor, or the crippled shopkeeper, Mary Chandler. TIlis illuminating
description of the way class and social context produced a variety of published female voices in eighteenth-century Britain makes Thomas's book an
outstanding contribution to the project of historicization outlined by Tobin.
Her attention to the public voices of women in the aristocracy and among
the working classes also does the added work of showing that women's
writing of the period was not completely circumscribed by domestic ideol-

ogy.
University of Colorado

Charlotte Sussman

Dangerous Enthusiasm: William Blake and the Culture of Radicalism in the 1790s
by Jon Mee. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Pp. xvi + 251. $58.50.
Witness Against the Beast: William Blake and the Moral Law by E. P. Thompson.
New York: The New Press, 1993. pp. xxi + 234. $30.00.
Traditional Blake studies have asked: was Blake a political radical or a
mystic, a radical democrat or an elitist devotee of art and the imagination?
For Mee and Thompson, Blake's radicalism is primary, the thing from which
everything else derives. Following the example, to some extent, of David
Erdman, whose Prophet Against Empire (1954; 3rd ed. 1977) influentially presented the case for the poetry's being understood in political terms and in relation to the political conflicts of Blake's own period, Mee and Thompson in
their very different ways contribute to and make more complex the argument for a radical Blake. It seems that today these are somewhat old-fashioned concerns, as the relevance of historical context and the fact of Blake's
radicalism have long been taken for granted. Moreover, the political! antipolitical dichotomies that informed decades of Blake studies now seem not
just less interesting but beside the point, as what makes Blake's writing most
distinctive does not seem to be describable in terms of that dichotomy.
All too aware of his principal critical precursor, Mee in his introduction
distinguishes his approach from that of Erdman. According to Mee, Erdman
only illustrated the ways in which historical events are reflected in Blake's
poetry; Mee, however, announces that he will deal more comprehensively
with Blake's radjcal rhetoric, language, and poetic forms (1-2). That Erdman
is as narrow and Mee as encompassing as the introduction declares is hardly
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certain. Nevertheless, despite a few ill effects of the anxiety of influence, Mee
makes some genuine contributions to Blake studies.
Although concentrating on the work of the 1790s (excluding, however, The
Four Zoas), Mee also makes an argument for understanding the whole of
Blake. His thesis is that Blake is representative of 1790s radicalism. Hardly
idiosyncratic, as Blake's image has often been, Blake was a bricoleur who
combined the two main radical ideologies of religious" enthusiasm" and Enlightenment rationalism. Blake's writing is "a variegated political discourse
that was an eclectic combination of a variety of received repertoires" from
these different traditions (4). Blake's belonging to a tradition of religious dissent is hardly a novel claim, of course, but the poetry's status as bricolage
from two seemingly incompatible traditions is original, I believe. Some critics, such as Marilyn Butler, have stressed Blake's Enlightenment lineage, at
least in the 1790s work, but Mee is making unusually strenuous claims for
Blake's rationalism. Even if those claims cannot be proven satisfactorily, they
force us to think in ways we might not have otherwise.
The first chapter is on popular religious "enthusiasm" and radical millenarianism, also the main focus of Thompson's book. Usefully describing the
largely plebeian "prophetic" discourse of the 1790s, Mee provides a detailed
context of religious rebellion within which Blake's own is coherent. Distinguishing betvveen a "pre-millenialism" that entailed a violent intervention by
Christ and a "post-millenialism" that was politically optimistic and gradualist, Mee persuasively situates Blake within the "unrespectable" radicalism of
antinomians and messianic prophets. Stylistic qualities of Blake's writingparallelism, use of parable, deliberate obscurity-Mee attributes to the prophetic tradition in its polite (Lowth) and unrespectable (Brothers) forms. Mee
describes vividly the 1790s plebeian tradition of religiOUS dissent at its most
"enthusiastic" and subversive, discussing figures unfamiliar to most Romanticists: Garnet Terry, Jolm Wright, Samuel How, Jolm Cooke, William Huntington, George Ribeau, and James ReIly. The extent to which the seventeenth-century revolutionary Protestantism survived into the nineteenth century is surprising (and is something Thompson investigates as well). Blake's
affinities with revolutinary Dissent have been noted often, for example
rather extensively by Michael Ferber (The Social Vision of William Blake, 1985),
but Mee shows precisely how lively and active such Dissenters were in
Blake's own London. Mee could have done more with the Swedenborgians,
about whom there has been considerable research already, and who were the
only religious group that we know with certainty with whom Blake had
some kind of relationship. Nevertheless, one can no longer ignore the energetic religious "enthusiasm" as an enabling context for Blake's own prophetic assertions. As we learn more about the 1790s, Blake comes to seem
less idiosyncratic, more typical (at least in certain ways).
A few claims in the first chapter are not convincing. 111at J. S. Jordan, radical publisher of Paine, also published the antinomian Garnet Terry, is hardly
a persuasive argument in itself for the compatibility betvveen rationalist and
religious dissent Mee wants to find. Joseph Johnson published both Godwin
and Malthus's attack on Godwin in the 1790s. It is indisputable that in the
1790s (and later as well) political radicals were both religious and secular,
even antireligious. Mee wants to insist there is something more than the ob-
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vious diversity of political radicalism. Another dubious claim in the first
chapter is that Blake's unpopularity was caused by his "enthusiastic" style
(46). First, the enthusiastic style did not make the numerous other authors
Mee cites unpopular; obviously, there was a considerable audience for this
style of writing but those readers did not, for whatever reasons, favor Blake.
Second, the issue of Blake's readability and accessibility to readers is more
complex than just matters of ideology and politics (see Stephen Behrendt's
recent book on Blake's readers, Rending William Blake, 1992). Blake is a difficult poet whose difficulty remains even after we note the various ideological
factors. Students in my Romantic literature courses find Blake much more
difficult than any of the other poets we read, and only so much can be factored out as my pedagogical incompetence. The fact is Blake's poetry requires a kind of reading that most readers find wlUsually challenging. One
has to assume that Blake's first readers were similary challenged; it is hardly
necessary to find ideological causes for interpretive difficulty.
The second chapter focuses on antiquarianism, popular and scholarly,
from Toland and Macpherson to Ritson. Mee shows how an English primitivism developed indigenously and in relation to Rousseau's. In Blake's writing the priestly Druids are opposed by the prophetic Bards, both of whom
existed already as antiquarian types. Mee informatively glosses the tree symbol in Blake and in antiquarian writing. Especially useful are the pages on
Joseph Ritson (113-20), the radical antiquarian scholar who debated the more
popular and conservative Percy. Although hardly the first to show the poet's
connections with antiquarianism, Mee shows how this living tradition
shaped feaures of Blake's writing.
The third chapter on mythography and politics, like the last chapter on
biblical criticism, presses the case for Blake's Enlightenment rationalism
more strenuously than I think can be sustained, but Mee nevertheless depicts vividly several of the intellectual contexts within which Blake wrote
and thought. Most impressive, perhaps, is Mee's showing how Los is shaped
in part by the influence of Erasmus Danvin, but as soon as he concedes the
difference between Darwin's materialism and Blake's divine humanity, we
are once again back where we started, with a counter-Enlightenment Blake
and the motto, "Mock on, mock on, Voltaire, Rousseau." It is nevertheless
useful to know that during the English Enlightenment even Christian apologsts were forced to deal \vith mythic imaginative constructions. Mee, however, aligns Blake rather too quickly, I believe, with the anti-Christians like
F<line and Volney; is not Blake also a Christian apologist, however unorthodox? Mee does not think so.
In the fourth chapter Mee illustrates aspects of the Lambeth prophecies by
showing the congruence between Blake's ideas and those of rationalist biblic.JI critics like Paine, Geddes, and Volney, insisting that the prophecies arc
"politic:ll." However, insofar as Blake's satire constructs an opposition between the "stony Law" of t'doses and the loving imagination of Jesus, it
merely exploits the always already existing anti-Judaism at the heart of the
most orthodox Christianity; one hardly needs the rationalist critique for
statemL'nts <1g<1inst the "brutillity" of the Old Testament. Moreover, if the
L<Hllbdh prophecies are "politic<1l, then in wh<1t W<1ys? The category of the
pl1litical i:-; ,) \'l'xed one in the book. \Vhen (vIce takes critics to task for their
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political shortcomings, he is least helpful: "Critics like [Leslie] Tannenbaum,
ever eager to read political quietism in Blake's texts as early in the 17905 as
possible ... " (209). There is a confusion here between people, who can be
either politically active or quietist, and writing, which carmot be either. The
confusion is Mee's, not TaIU1enbaum's. ll1ere is no evidence of which r am
aware that Blake was ever politically active. He could have joined the London Corresponding Society like his friend and fellow-engraver Sharp, but he
seems not to have done so. If he participated in meetings, riots, demonstrations, or signed protest petitions, such participation has not left any evidence. However rebellious the meanings one can find in The Marriage of
Heave" and He/I, probably Blake's most radical text, one should not call it
"activist," nor should one call liTo Tirzah" or Milton "quietist." The opposition is false and misleading in tvvo ways, suggesting that Blake renounced a
politics there is no evidence he ever asserted in the first place, and that writing automatically gets translated into identifiable political deeds.
The conclusion is the book's weakest and shortest section, arguing w1persuasively that Blake's lack of popularity was because of his peculiar synthesis of rationalist and religious dissent, the former appealing to a bourgeois audience that found the latter plebeian and distastefully "enthusiastic"
(223-24). Hypothetically one might grant the possibility that a bourgeois
readership \vould see Blake as too radical, but what about the large readership of radical literature? Paine sold in the hundreds of thousands. Had
Blake's primary aim been to reach the plebeian readership for political writing, one presumes he could have done so.
However imperfect, Mee's book is a genuine contribution to Blake studies,
and especially to 1790s literary studies in general.
The late E. P. Thompson's book is more than just another contribution to
Blake studies because Thompson was a political figure and thinker of considerable stature. It is ironic that this indefatigable political activist should
author a final book about a poet who might never have participated in actual
politics. That is just one of the ironies that arises reading these nvelve chapters.
Thompson writes extensively on the antinomian context, most particularly
the Muggletonians, a revolutionary sect from the Puritan revolution of the
seventeenth century, and in general the late eighteenth-century antinomians
who carried into the nineteenth century some of the earlier revolutionary
"Ranting" and "enthusiasm." Thompson writes movingly, with sympathy
and compassion, about the sect he believes is closest to representing Blake's
own position, so that even if make were not an actual Muggletonian, he was
a virtual one. \Vhereas I'vJee's Blake is a bricolcllr combining various discourses, Thompson's is a single coherent figure, an antinomian, understandable
only as such. Thompson even traced down the last living Muggletonian in
England, helping to transfer the sect's records and papers to the British Library, Additionally, there are some astute pages of literary philology, as
Thompson pro\'ides glosses on the "Divine Image," chartered and marks (for
"London"), and the "Human Abstract."
Thompson was not able to find a definite link between Blake and the London :'viuggletonians of the day, Perhaps Blake's mother's family had some
j\.lugglctonian5, but that is the closest link Thompson could find. Thomp-
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son's argument depends less on proving Blake's membership in the group
than in sharing its worldview, and on that issue he provides some compelling evidence. Expanding upon the findings of A. L. Morton, who first linked
Blake with the "everlasting gospel" of antinomianism, Thompson describes
the Muggletonians as the sect most Blakean among all the various dissenting
religious influences to which the poet was exposed. In chapter six TIlompson
shows how, among the various survivors of the seventeenth-cenhrry revolutionary conflict, the Muggletonians stressed a fierce, Blakean opposition to a
demonized "reason." They also repudiated the "moral law" in favor of the
"everlasting gospel" of love, narrated the Fall with Blakean symbolism of the
serpent copulating with Eve, repudiated entirely both priesthood and traditionalliturgy (they met in a public house and sang songs composed by the
various Muggletonian "prophets"). When God became Christ, according to
the Muggletonians, there was then no other God but Christ. Thereafter, divinity was an entirely human phenomenon. One of the few groups to whom
the logiC and imagery of The Book of Urizen would not have been utterly
strange was the Muggletonians. Unlike the Quakers, who accomodated
themselves with the "Beast" of power ("hegemony"), the Muggletonians did
not budge, refused to adjust their beliefs to the new conditions, even if they
did cease to make actual war against the state and its church.
Thompson's will be the standard book of reference for Blake's antinomianism until a better one comes along. The antinomianism needs, however, to
be more fully contextualized in terms of both Anglican doctrine and especially the Methodist movement, so that we can see just how "dissenting"
Blake's religious ideas actually were. Witness Against the Beast has surprisingly little to say about the Methodists, who attracted in the eighteenth century far more plebeian adherents than the old Puritans. For a book that deals
with theology rather extensively, it is also disappointing that it draws upon
so little theology except antinomianism. Others will have to do this contexutalizing work.
As Thompson positions himself outside Blake scholarship, so I feel justified in doing the same, and asking how Blake fits into Thompson's overall
writing. The key chapter is, I think, the seventh, "Anti-Hegemony." According to Thompson, the Muggletonians and other antinomians "were hegemony's eightenth-century opposition" (109). Blake, then, although he might
never have been politically active, is for Thompson a political exemplar by
embodying the position of "anti-hegemony." In Thompson's historically relativist scheme, Hegelian-Marxist Reason most cunningly and ironically descended upon an obscure London engraver who articulated the revolutionary message for that time, was indeed a "witness" against the "beast" of
"hegemony." Blake provides the human face lacking in the rationalist materialism of Paine and Volney (and by implication, Marxism), the spiritual substance for atheistic radicalism. 1110mpson has long searched for something to
rectify what he saw as the inadequacies of Marxism. His William Morris
book, first written while Thompson was a Communist, tried to yoke Marxist
"necessity" with Romantic imagination. Morris was the poet who became a
militant, while at the end of his career as a militant Thompson appropriates
a poet. It does not seem at all that Thompson was responding to religious
stirrings of his own in his last years; rather, his very Marxist commitment
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from the start required a spiritual, imaginative, ethical "supplement." Morris
was an acceptable additive because he was, after all, a militant activist in the
Marxist movement. Blake was equally acceptable because of his plebeian social status and the absence of any signs of compromise with the powers that
be (that latter assumption is more than a little questionable). As Blake's religion can be construed plausibly as humanistic, it can coexist, if uneasily,
with Marxist atheistic materialism. If Blake can be hitched to "anti-hegemony" and appropriated for Marxism, Thompson has effectively increased
the prestige, especially the "humanistic" dimension, of a Marxism that is beginning to seem now almost as antiquated as Muggletonianism.
Blake hardly needs the help that Marxism now does. That, however, is another subject for another occasion. Nevertheless, there is a real issue that
Thompson's book raises: who can appropriate Blake? for what purposes?
Thompson argues against the claims of critics like "Miss Raine" (however
much he disliked Raine, did he also have to use the sexist designation?),
who align Blake with the occult and mystical, with such passion and conviction that clearly the stakes are high. Do only certain kinds of poets provoke
this kind of battle for ownership? I don't think there is a similar battle over,
say, Shakespeare or Wordsworth, but there is one over Shelley (or there used
to be). Blake, like Shelley, wrote some of the most radical verse in English, so
that later radicals have wanted to preserve that radicalism, but both poets
also wrote verse that might be radical in some senses but is also quite readable in other ways-Neoplatonic, mystical, and so on. Then what? Blake's
case is more difficult because we have so little to go on other than the actual
poetry, but Thompson's book does help us, I think, in reading the poet. That
seemingly otherworldly, apolitical meanings are more accurately interpreted
in terms of a decaying antinomian tradition does indeed matter.
With Mee and Thompson we are a long way from Frye's "Orc cycle" and
Bloom's apocalyptic prophet against nature. The Bronowski-Erdman tradition of reading Blake as a radical, which Mee and Thompson continue, has
been strongest in establishing contexts and providing discrete gloss; it has
been weakest where the Frye-Bloom tradition has been strongest, in prOViding overall readings of individual poems and the entire Blakean oeuvre. Neither Mee nor Thompson rectifies the weaknesses of the tradition in which
they are working.
Neither book deals with Joseph Viscomi's work, which was published too
late for either of them to mention, but Viscomi's Blake and The Idea of the Book
(Princeton, 1993) and his subsequent work will probably redefine Blake
studies in dramatic ways that neither Mee's nor Thompson's will. Viscomi's
encyclopedic research into the processes of Blake's printmaking and bookmaking suggests a "Blake" adequately described by neither Frye nor Erdman. Although the Bronowski-Erdman tradition will continue to provide us
with local insights and informative contexts, the most exciting future of
Blake studies seems to belong elsewhere.
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Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of Reading by
Richard J. Gerrig. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. Pp. xii + 274,
$30.00.

Early in Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of
Reading, Richard Gerrig recalls the disciplinary divide opened between psychology and literary criticism through Wimsatt and Beardsley's invocation of
the "affective fallacy," the false hope of grounding criticism in psychological
perspectives. Gerrig, an associate professor of psychology at Yale, recalls this
moment to make amends with literary theorists: Ifin the decades since Wimsatt and Beardsley stated their objections," Gerrig writes, "researchers have
made progress toward developing an experimental psychology of reader response that is not so easily assailed" (26). In the intervening decades, literary
criticism has also witnessed sweeping changes, becoming more interested as
well in the psychology of reading. Gerrig's book seeks to take advantage of
these trajectories, to offer an interdisciplinary beginning, and to start drawing together the insights of the two seemingly different research agendas in
an attempt to redress the affective fallacy, finding cornmon ground with literary critics in psychology's accounts of a reader's cognition.
Gerrig proposes that it is in fact the reader's act of cognitive integration of
textual cues with memories that defines the experience of the "narrative
world" of literature. Gerrig develops this cognitive point into a phenomenological account of reading a narrative by claiming that actively participating
in the construction of a narrative, a reader is transported, is so invested in
the experience as to be cognitively removed from the immediate surroundings. This basic position provides the framework through which Gerrig proceeds to describe, throughout the book, the cognitive and phenomenological
overlap in reading. While he derives his arguments about cognition primarily from his own empirical research, the results verify and extend well-established psychological theories. Such theories, that readers "make" meaning
in response to an active, contextualized experience with texts, also have
well-established parallels with reader-response theory.
One of the more thoroughly worked out versions of these connections is
found in the social-cognitive theories of James Wertsch, who exploits the dialogic literary theories of M. M. Bakhtin and the closely allied psychological
theories of Bakhtin's fellow countryman, Lev Vygotsky. As Wertsch's theories are current in American cognitive research, and as he sets up a theory of
textual cognition and narrativity through his use of Bakhtin, I was quite surprised to find no mention of him in Gerrig's Book. In fact I was quite surprised to find such a limited use of literary theory, especially of reader-response theory, in a book promising to bridge a disciplinary divide. In addition, his use of literary examples was highly circumscribed, limited primarily
to contemporary realist fiction. Gerrig did, however, make extensive use of
Anglo-American linguistics and ordinary language philosophy. As a result of
his choices, I found myself growing wary of Gerrig's claims, suspicious of
his motives for wanting to generate accounts of the phenomenological experience of reading from accounts of the psychology of reading. In particular
I wanted to know how his work answers to concerns in literary theory in
general.
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The answers came in chapter three, "Participatory Responses," where Gerrig discusses a reader's participation in a narrative. As a counter-example of
participation, he states that readers who are so disinvested in a narrative as
to be uninclined to yell "Watch Out!" when danger threatens an unsuspecting character, are choosing "not to participate in the appropriate way" (66),
What might it mean to suggest the "appropriate way" to respond? For Gerrig, delineating the appropriateness of a reader's response is synonymous
with identifying the cognitive dimensions of reading. Explicitly developing a
cognitive perspective through which to appropriate the experience of reading, Gerrig implicitly develops a criterion for an appropriate narrative experiel1Ce. Under the guise of empirical veracity, Gerrig universalizes the phenomenology of reading from cognitive experiments limited to experiences of
realist fiction in which readers are consh·ucted so as to seek after authorial
intention. His conclusion to this chapter summarizes this quite neatly, "p-responses [cognitive responses} often function to enrich emotional and aesthetic aspects of a narrative world: by p-respondi11g, readers draw themselves solidly into the narrative world" (96).
Yet Gerrig's argument seems to me to do more than attempt a scientizing
of the experience of reading literature. In the context of the "crisis" in theory
in English Studies, and the more general cultural debates over the value of
literature and the professionalization of its study, I read Gerrig's arguments
as an assault on the institutional and cultural role of the literary intellectual.
This became apparent to me in his misuse of Stanley Fish's work, one of
the few theorists Gerrig argues from. Describing reading as a kind of conversational practice, Gerrig draws a direct link to Stanley Fish's concept of "interpretive community." Rather than accepting the full force of Fish's point
that what counts as meaning, that what even counts as text, is inseparable
from community practices, Gerrig reintroduces the author's intent, by constraining a reader's interpretation through the textual cues and linguistic features of the text. In Gerrig's view, readers can get the author's meaning because they "are able to review parts of a text that may figure heavily in the
wayan author establishes meaning" (122). Certainly there is a text lo read
and respond to, but the point, precisely the point Fish develops at length, is
that the specific features of the text don't matter; what really matters is the
context and the constraints "ivithin which the text is acted upon.
Gerrig under-appreciates Fish, but he also comes out strongly against Derrida in his discussion of John Searle. Gerrig reasserts that Derridil's demonstration in LilJlited, II1C., "in no way undermines the claim that he<1rer5, c1J1d
readers, obligatorily strive to recover unique intentions" (139). Affirming the
"psycholinguistic gestalt for theories of 'actual behavior.''' Gerrig concludes,
"Derridil might work to reform the rules of 'reading' but he (<lnnot legislatc
cognitiyc processes out of existence" (140). Perhaps not. But Gcrrig hcls once
iJgiJin missed the full force of the ilTgument. The point is, <It lea;:;t from il
poststrllctur<lli;:;t perspectiYc, that the "cogniti\'e processes" arc ill\\,ilys cllready written, clnd they are most certainly rewritten in cogniti\·C' psychol(lgy,
cl discourse th<lt then rein5cribes them in clcts like reading, producing cl cklin
nf signified;:; without <lny solid nriginar~· grounding in either inlL'ntinn (lr
cngnitinn.
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In the final chapter, referring to the famous passage in Plato's Republic
banishing poets from the ideal state, Gerrig offers what seems his real interest in narrative. Inferring that poetry must matter a great deal, he proposes
in this chapter to develop a psychological theory "to match Plato's certainty
that stories matter" (197). Does Gerrig think then that poets should be banished? Not hardly. Rather he invokes Plato to enter the contentious debate
about just how it is poetry, stories, and narratives "matter." He argues that
"fictional information has real-world effects. Gerrig's aim is clear, to trace
out real-world effects that align with "psychological models of the uptake of
fictional information, both with respect to mental representations and to
moment-by-moment processing" (202).
In making this claim, Gerrig misrepresents the tradition of literary criticism as simply Coleridgeian "aestheticism" (202). Invoking "professional
readers," he states, "theories of literary criticism that attempt to regulate
real-world effects of fiction out of existence fail to capture the real-world activities of competent readers. What I suggest ... is that theories of the experience of fiction have quite regularly obscured the pathways through which
fictions can have good or ill effects on such readers" (207). Gerrig argues that
the pedagogical implications of this view, that students as readers can be
trained to "experience fictional narratives in such a way that they could treat
them only as aesthetic objects" (203), runs counter to empirical evidence of
the deep cognitive structure" of narrative experiences: "Whatever new language games theorists might invent to strengthen the [aesthetic] ideal will
necessarily clash with inherent psychological properties" (203).
I take exception to Gerrig's assault on English Studies from the Psychology
Department, his view that literature departments in the institutionalization
of their reading strategies aestheticize and make fiction irrelevant. Not only
are these claims uninformed, they rest on positivistic presuppositions. Certainly the processes of decoding, of reading, that Gerrig treats as natural are
socialized-are manufactured through the organization and dissemination of
texts within a culture. But Gerrig does not broach the question in this way,
and as a result of not recognizing, as Wertsch does, the social dimension of
cognition, he only provides a proscriptive perspective on strategies of reading he sees as not only "unnatural" but therefore as counterproductive.
Gerrig concludes this final chapter with a further suggestion for the place
of aestheticized reading: readers may train themselves and others to "undertake special analysis of a text based on the beliefs that authors might purposely conceal meanings and that meanings might be hidden from even the
authors themselves" (240). By exposing the irrelevancies that arise from overtheorizing or aestheticizing literature, Gerrig suggests that the aggressively
controlled reading of literature requires a passive surrender to the more immediate, cognitive experiences of reading. Has he thereby answered the
affective fallacy? Not in any satisfactory way. If he had read Stanley Fish
more closely, he might have realized, "being interdisciplinary is so very hard
to do."
fI
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Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity edited by John R. Gillis.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. xii + 290. $35.00.
The introduction by John R. Gillis to this volume of essays provides a succinct orientation to the subjects subsequently examined while also whetting
the reader's appetite to pursue irrunediately the different directions outlined.
These studies' common goal is deceptively simple: given the status of memory and identity as political and social constructs and of their relationship as
historically situated, "the record of that relationship can be traced through
various forms of commemoration," i.e. various modes of coordinating "individual and group memories, whose results may appear consensual when
they are in fact the product of processes of intense contest, struggle, and, in
some instances, annihilation" (5). Providing historical as well as sociocultural
foci, these essays span several centuries (from early modern Europe to the
present) and societies (from the Middle East to North America), and Gillis's
remarks situate the development of the memory !identity nexus through the
overlapping phases of the "pre-national" (up to the late 1700s), the "national" (end of the eighteenth century to the 1960s) and the current, "post-national" phase.
Some of the points that Gillis emphasizes are: the shifting class and fixed
gender and race specificities of commemorative initiatives from one phase to
the next; the struggles that occur between social groups when challenged by
proposed commemorative events; the move from commemoration of the
dead to the living and the consequent change of rituals; and above all, the
role that "concerted forgettings" play in all processes of remembering (7-18).
Underscoring the political stakes in the memory lidentity relationship, Gillis
argues that it was not until the 1960s and their aftermath that "a new iconoclasm" develops resulting in the search for "usable pasts capable of serving
the heterogeneity of new groups that had become active on the national and
international stage: racial and sexual minorities, women, youth, and dozens
of new nations and ethnic groups aspiring to sovereign status" (19). However, the "democratization of memory" for those groups developing new
identities becomes "profanation, or, what is worse, cultural suicide" for other
groups invested in the sacredness of the nation-state (19). Hence, the battle
lines are drawn on political, cultural and even commercial fronts, but Gillis
maintains that in this transitional "era of plural identities," the publicizing of
memories and identities is more necessary than ever in order to ensure "the
democratic processes by which individuals and groups come together to discuss, debate, and negotiate the past and, through this process, define the future" (20).
The two essays constituting the volume's first section (entitled "The Problem of Identity and Memory") provide a solid basis from which the three
subsequent sections can proceed. Richard Handler's opening "Is 'Identity' a
Useful Cross-Cultural Concept?" raises suspicions about this fundamental
term as both a scholarly and cultural construct since its seeming "naturalness" belies the distinctive trait of "identity" as constituted within entirely
situated contexts. Following recent scholarship that has emphasized various
modes of constructing "identity," Handler argues that groups are best understood not as "bounded objects in the natural world ... [but as] symbolic
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processes that emerge and dissolve the particular contexts of action," a
perspective requiring a language" other than the discourse of identity in order to be able to comment creatively upon that discourse" (30). From his examination of both non-Western and recent Western conceptions (e.g. in Jane
Austen's novels) of individuality and social collectivity, Handler concludes
that not only is our twentieth-century conception of "identity" inadequate
for application to other periods and cultures, but also that "identity" contributes little to scholarship on "nationalist activism, historical preservation, and
the creation of tradition" (37). He recognizes, however, the politically delicate problem raised by this laller objection since groups who frequently tum
to such identity claims (e.g. ethnic leaders, ministries of culture) do so for
legitimate political reasons, however hegemonic and ideologically oppressive
such claims may ultimately be. 11ms, Handler argues that the focus of scholarly critique should be on mainstream, and usually unchallenged, identity
claims while constructively pointing out to minority groups the consequences of promoting homogeneous cultural consh'ucts without due reflection (38).
David Lowenthal pursues similar lines of thought in the second chapter,
"Identity, Heritage and History," stating that the title's first two terms currently "swim in a self-congratulatory swamp of collective memory" (41), an
attitude often fuelling rivalry and conflicts. Having traced the submission of
selfhood to collective consciousness in past memoirs, Lowenthal suggests
that "heritage," once referring only to the attributes of the elite, now is a
popular link, "distill[ing] the past into icons of identity, bonding us with
precursors and progenitors, with our own earlier selves, and with our promised successors" (43). While remaining "metaphorically ancestra!," says Lowenthal, heritage today functions mainly "to confirm the identity and boost
the solidarity of nations and self-assured ethnic groups" (44). Heritage categories now become homogenized due, in large part, to global interdependence, and tend to exclude other groups' claims to virtue, civilization, and
comparable worth. And the requirement that socially binding traditions be
accepted on faith, not by reasoning, now distingUishes heritage from history:
"Heritage thus defies empirical analysis; it features fantasy, invention, mystery, error" (49), through diverse modes of memorialization and amnesia. To
the current rise of nationalist claims also corresponds the rise of extreme tension and conflict, as the evening news drives home daily, in the form of rivalries, disputes, and rhetorical bombast. Lowenthal concludes that comparison between heritages, rather than myopic insistence on exclusivity, can contribute to quelling such conflicts: "National heritage emerges from linkages
(and rivalries) among all the identities that inhabit us" (54).
In order to highlight properly the different modes of commemoration constitutive of identity, memory and heritage, each subsequent section develops
a particular (yet quite broad) focus.
In part two, "Memory in the Construction of National Identities," David
Cressy considers the role of dynastic and church authorities in shaping popular understanding of early modern England's national memories and commemorations; Jolm Brodner studies the debates over (official vs. vernacular)
public memory with special focus on the stages of commemoration during
this century in Cleveland, Ohio; Eric Davis examines the museum as form
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and site of social control of both "high" and "low culture" in modern Iraq;
and Yael Zerubavel juxtaposes the overlapping discourses of "history" and
"legend" in Israeli commemoration of the (1920) Tel Hai battle.
In part three, "Memories of War and Wars over Memory," Kirk Savage defines the strategic functions of the Civil War memorial for recasting commemoration away from black emancipation and toward national reconciliation and harmony; Thomas W. Laqueur describes the "new era of remembrance" brought about through "naming" the European war dead as a
process of memorialization following World War I; G. Kurt Piehler examines
the United States government's strategy of creating the Gold Star Mother following World War I as a means to identify motherhood, and a certain kind
of woman's identity, with the selfless sacrifice of their sons in defense of the
nation; and Daniel J. Sherman studies the World War I monument in France
as a site for conjoining a variety of discourses and practices: local and nationalf commercial and artisticf high and lowf and ultimately perhapsf history and memory" (187).
In part four, "Politics of Memory and Identity," Rudy J. Koshar considers
the role o( and contradictions withinf historic preservation of buildings and
towns in Germany as a privileged mode both of memorialization and of coping with forms of nationalist insecurity; Herman Lebovics situates the cultural and political debates around the vexed and shifting questions of the
Hessential France fl and authentic French heritage f focussing on cultural wars
in the 1930s and 19605; and Claudia Koonz examines the struggles of memorialization and historical amnesia related to concentration camp memorial
museums in post-World War II Germany, East and West.
With these brief summaries, I mean merely to orient readers to what these
essays might offer quite generally, leaving it to each reader, depending on
his/her own interestsf to pursue the in-depth process of discovery. I hope to
have made clear the common effort by all the contributors to follow the
broad lines of inquiry established in the introduction and opening chapters.
In each of the cultural contexts examinedf the contributors emphasize the diverse processes by which identity and memory are reciprocally constructed
through commemoration and, concomitantlYf how these constructions are
variably exploited within particular socio-political and economic circumstances. Far from being rabidly relativist however, the contributors draw
conclusions based on very sound historical data succinctly presented. Yet in
doing so, they also avail themselves of many critical insights that have arisen
from recent debates on the relationship of history to narrative and discourse
theories. Hencef this volume offers not only an array of analyses of specific
socio-historical practices, but also important examples of an unselfconscious
and highly productive approach to cultural studies.
II
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Discovering Difference: Contemporary Essays in American Culture edited by
Christoph K. Lohmann. Bloommgton and Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1993. Pp. 203. $29.95, cloth; $12.95, paper.

In a speech entitled, "The Transformation of Silence into Language and
Action," poet Audre Larde, writes about how a brush with cancer forced her
to reevaluate her life. She reflects, "In becoming forcibly and essentially
aware of my mortality, and of what I wished and wanted for my life, however short it might be, priorities and omissions became strongly etched in a
merciless light, and what I most regretted were my silences" (Sister Outsider
[Freedo, CA: The Crossing Press, 1984], 41). As an African-American lesbian
poet, Larde is acutely aware of how people perceive difference as a barrier
rather than a bridge to each other. When difference creates distance within
the academy, Lorde urges scholars "not to hide behind the mockeries of separations that have been imposed upon us and which we so often accept as
our own" (Larde, 43). At lUliversities, allegiances to a specific discipline, research methodology, or subject or inquiry are some of the ways in which
scholars build these fences of separation. For Lorde, only open dialogue can
act as an antidote to this form of intellectual disengagement-"for it is not
difference that immobilizes us, but silence. And there are so many silences to
be broken" (Lorde, 44).
In the introduction of the book, Discovering Difference: Contemporary Essays
in American Culture, editor Christoph K. Lohmann presents the anthology as
a collaborative effort in the spirit of Lorde's sentiments. At the onset, Lohmann expresses the hope that readers, like the audience of the lecture series
on which the book is based, will experience "listening to different voices
speaking to each other in open dialogue rather than for the purpose of waging intellectnal tnrf battles" (xi). In literary and cultnral stndies, these "tnrf
battIes"-according to Lohmann-are being waged between "two warring
factions: the 'traditionalists' and the 'poststructuralists' or 'multicultnralists'" (ix). For both sides in this academic contest the stakes are high. As
Lohmann notes, "course offerings, degree requirements, and tenure and promotion criteria" often hinge on who decides what defines a field of inquiry,
and the dissension that arises between the competing parties has a "polarizing effect" (ix).
Discovering Difference, "a deliberately eclectic collection of essays [that]
may please neither the outside observer of the academic scene nor the specialist within the adademy" (x), presents the alternatives of "dialogic engagement rather than rhetorical aggression" (xi). Using a chronological framework, the essays in Discovering Difference cover a broad expanse of timefrom 1492 when Columbus "discovers" America to the 1992 Anita Hill/
Clarence Thomas controversy. Within this large sweep across the centuries,
the anthology proceeds to live up to its self-professed "eclectic" label as it offers ten essays engaging in the theme of "difference" from markedly different
perspectives. Discovering Difference includes readings of literature, film, and
television, as well as cultural and literary theory.
The literature essays alone attest to the diversity of the Discovering Difference project. In orie of the first articles in the collection, Eva Chemiavsky uses
Susanna Rowson's Charlotte Temple to illustrate how, in mid-nineteenth-
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century America sentimental novels both contribute to and complicate lithe
emergent ideology of the bourgeois nuclear family" (36), as the women readers of these novels established a "collective identity" which reinforced their
sense of exclusion from the republican political order. Jonathan Elmer's essay, "Poe, Plagiarism, and the Prescriptive Right of the Mob," examines how
the themes of Poe's story, "William Wilson," reflect its author's own opinions about plagiarism, which correspond to larger social anxieties in the
nineteenth century about the "nature of identity ... in what we might call
the mass-textual world of publishing" (69). In his essay, "The Underheard
Reader in the Writing of the Old Southwest," James H. Justus offers another
perspective on the repercussions of the "mass-textual world of publishing"
in nineteenth-century America. In the 1830s and 1840s, the writing of Southwestern humorists achieved mass appeal-culminating in the work of Mark
Twain. Justus argues that while this style of writing celebrates and uses regional dialects for much of its humor, the humorists themselves rely on
standard literary conventions to tell these stories, which subvert the power
of "backwoods" vernacular speech. Justus writes, "[t]he authority lies not
with those primitives who speak with vernacular bite but with the moderns
who mimic those idioms in writing" (55). From this perspective, the Southwestern humorists' attempts to document difference-the "Otherness" of the
"backwoods" dialed-in literary forms accentuate their distance from that
oral subculture.
Alongside these articles on literature, the anthology also confronts the
larger theoretical questions inherent in "discovering difference." In the essay,
"Why Did the European Cross the Ocean? A Seventeenth-Century Riddle,"
Myra Jehlen discusses the distinction betwen the terms "other" and "difference," as well as the history of their use from Montaigne to Todorov. Jehlen
contends that while '!lother' seems to cast the speaker's cultural interlocutors
in an inferior position ... [t]he term 'different' proposes to right this imbalance by granting others identities of their own" (2). Regardless of the improvement of "different" over "other," Jehlen argues for the use of a third
term, "contested zone," "meaning cultural areas and social regions that different groups seek to define each in its own way" (12). Similar to Jehlen's
agenda, Cary Wolfe's article, "Antinomies of Liberalism: The Politics of 'Belief' and the Project of Americanist Criticism," also offers a critique of the
ways in which scholars perceive" difference" by examining the dominance of
liberalism in Americanist scholarship through a close analYSis of the work of
Walter Benn Michaels.
Two articles, Michel Rogin's, "The Great Mother Domesticated: Sexual Difference and Sexual Indifference in D. W. Griffith's Intolerance," and Carolyn
A. Mitchell's, "Choicelessness as Choice: The Conflation of Racism and Sexism," which analyze visual rather than literary texts, confirm the ilnpressive
range of Discovering Difference. For Rogin, close readings of the themes and
images of D. W. Griffith's Intolerance reveal pervasive cultural anxieties
about the power of female sexuality in early twentieth-century America in
light of the birth control movement. Mitchell's article examines the Clarence
Thomas/ Anita Hill controversy and foregrounds the power of the television
camera, which is "capable of manipulating public knowledge of an event,
and ultimately, shaping public opinion" (190). Mitchell interprets the telef
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vised image of Thomas as he testified at his coniinnation hearing. To uncover the political underpirnlings of this image, Mitchell analyzes the camera's framing the nominee, against a backdrop of his wife, Virginia Thomas,
and Republican Senator John Danforth, which accentuates the absence of Anita Hill. Mitchell's essay contributes to her strong belief that the public
should not be "ignorant of the camera's politics" (198).
While Mitchell's essay addresses a contemporary event, three essays in
Discovering Difference directly engage in questions of historical change. ln
"American Literature Discovers Columbus/' Terence Martin traces the multiple ways that Columbus has been mythologized in the United States from
the eighteenth century to the present. Through this history, Martin illustrates
how shifts in America's national identity have required revisions of the Columbus myth from "discoverer" as hero to imperialist villain. Cynthia Griffin Wolff's essay, '''Margaret Garner': A Cincinnati Story," shares Martin's
approach as it also argues that specific historical moments generate a need
for specific stories and myths that speak to the concerns and anxieties of that
time period. In the article, Wolff discusses how the "unspeakable" story of
Garner, an enslaved woman who commits infanticide to protect her child
from a life in slavery, finds a voice in Toni Morrison's 1987 novel, Beloved. In
an astute historical comparison, Wolff compares Morrison's full dramatization of the story to Harriet Beecher Stowe's nineteenth-century depictions of
slave existence in Uncle Tom's Cabill. Wolff uses this comparison to highlight
the limitations of Stowe's antebellum novel, which maintains a silence about
Garner's tale and therefore truncates the psychological complexity of slave
existence.
Michael T. Gilmore's "Hawthorne and tl,e Making of the Middle Class"
also focuses on the antebellum novel-in this case, The Scarlet Letter-to examine the history of the formation of the middle class in the nineteenth century. Gilmore advances the argument that questions of class are often marginalized in the study of nineteenth-century American literature and need as
much critical attention as race and gender have received. Through a close
reading of The Scarlet Letter, Gilmore demonstates how the book "participates
in the project of shaping middle-class identity.
[and] encodes tl,e deep
structures of the middle class within its discursive patternings" (89). The
strength of Gilmore's thesis lies not simply in his assertion of the importance
of class analysis, but in his argument that the tensions and ambiguities in
The Scarlet Lctter reflect the fluid and contested process of class formation. In
other words, antebellum novels can be used to develop a more elaborate
understanding of the internal conflicts within the development of nineteenth-century, middle-class identity.
If a reader turns to Discoverillg Differel1ce to discover difference, the anthology clearly does not disappoint. The heterogeneity of the essays reflect the
editor's sincere desire to present a multiplicity of voices. Yet, after completing all of the ten essays, I was disappoined that each of the "voices" presented spoke in isol<1tion rather than in conversation with the others. If the
objective of the book is "open dialogue" as Lohmann asserts, then the interchange needs to be explicit rather than implicit and left up to the reader to
construct. A possible altern<1tivc to Discovering Differel1ce's approach of presenting ten <Iutonomous topics would be to ask several scholars to examine
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one text, such as The Scarlet Leftcr or D. W. Griffith's Intolerance, from multiple perspectives. With this design, a reader could both" discover difference"
in approach and witness dialogue as individual \vriters respond to the same
work and to each others' analyses. The imperative of ending "intellectual
turf battles" and breaking the silences that keep scholars from learning from
each other is too important to ignore. Discovering Difference offers one possibility for ending these destructive patterns. May it inspire many more.

Yale University
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Real and Imagined Women: Gender, Culture and Postcolonialisl11 by Rajeswari
Sunder Rajan. London and New York: Routledge, 1993. Pp. 153. $59.95,
cloth; $16.95, paper.
Even as the MLA job list expands to incorporate the concept of "cultural
studies" as a new area of specialization, the struggle to determine its parameters and define the theoretical and methodological paradigms for a cultural
critique continues among professionals in the field. Sunder Rajan's book is a
welcome addition to this ongoing debate and provides a refreshing insight
into the problems and pitfalls, as well as the political necessity at this historical moment, for the development of a concept such as "cultural studies."
Sunder Rajan defines the term "culture" as "the product of the beliefs and
conceptual models of society and as the destination where the trajectory of
its desires takes shape, as well as the everyday practices, the contingent realities, and the complex process by which these are structured" (10). By including both "conceptual models" and "contingent realities" in this definition, Sunder Rajan attempts to deconstruct the culture/society division and
provides a space for a critique that is engaged equally with discourse and
materiality. The key concept that enables such a critique is that of "representation." By exploring the heterogeneity of cultural representations and their
resulting openness to interpretation as \vell as contestation, Sunder Rajan is
able to combine a critique of ideology with a form of political intervention
that provides a much needed bridge between feminist theory and praxis.
However, the brilliant execution of this cultural analysis in this book is
somewhat marred by Sunder Rajan's failure to engage in any detailed theoretical discussion of the central concept of representation. The only place that
has any discussion of the term itself is in the chapter on women in politics
where the focus is exclusively on questions of political representation rather
than the broader category of cultural representation. The theoretical confusion thus generated complicates the question of agency in the analysis of
representation of contestation in the final section of the book~how are these
"self-representations" different from previous "representations"? Does their
oppositional value lie in the interpretative act of the reader or in the female
agency that is implicit in the very creation of these texts (as may be implied
by the tenTI "sc~f-rcpresentation")? The failure of this book to pro\·ide clear
answers to sllch questions leaves a seriolls gap in its theoretical framework.
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This conceptual confusion, however, does not detract from the book's excellent analysis of the creation of female subjectivity and its reconstitution in
the interests of feminist praxis. Through a very succinct and balanced summary of the current debates raging around the constitntion of the subject
Sunder Rajan proves the unsuitability, for a feminist praxis, of adopting
either the universal humanist version of subjectivity or its total rejection by
certain schools of poststructnralist thought. Sunder Rajan's theoretical inclinations are clearly closer to the latter position, and consequently, she introduces the concept of a "resisting subject" that allows for a measure of agency
and thus fills the total vacuum left by the death of the subject while retaining a sense of the politics of difference by manifesting itself as contingent,
varied, and flexible in its modes of resistance. The concept of the resisting
subject provides an effective theoretical alternative both to Spivak's complete
denial of Ollf ability to access "real" women, as well as to Benita Parry's valorization of "real" women's voices in the form of artists and singers of sacred songs. In the context of feminisms' need to have a focal point for their
programs of political intervention, I find this reconstitution of female subjectivity in terms of the resisting subject to be one of the most enabling strategies in the book.
The practical implications of this theoretical construct are clearly spelt out
through Sunder Rajan's detailed analysis of sati, rape, and wife-murder
(dowry deaths). Each of these discussions begins with a useful summary of
the existing debates on the topic and points towards exciting new avenues of
exploration. In the case of sati, for example, Sunder Rajan refuses primacy to
questions of intentionality and voluntariness that are at the center of current
pro- as well as anti-sati arguments, and, instead, chooses to focus on the materiality of the body in pain as it burns. This shift in focus not only highlights the immediate experiential quality of the act that is the subject of numerous theoretical debates but also allows Sunder Rajan to see, in the image
of the burning woman straining to overcome her pain, a representation of a
resisting subject who can no longer be viewed merely as a helpless victim.
In her analysis of sati in terms of the politics of pain Sunder Rajan draws
upon Elaine Scarry's theoretical inSights in The Body in Pain. This use of the
work of a western scholar to examine a Third World phenomenon raises difficult questions about the possibly imperialist relationship between Western
theory and Third World material. Concerns like those expressed by Chandra
Mohanty of being ''tmder Western eyes" are, in fact, a major area of inquiry
in Sunder Rajan's work. Her self-reflexive positioning of herself, at the beginning of the book, as a postcolonial intellectnallocated in the Third World
academy but with significant intellectual cormections with the West, foregrounds problems of appropriation, complicity, and compromise that circumscribe desires for Third World autonomy. Sunder Rajan's personal stand
with respect to this First World/Third World opposition is clearly stated in
the "Introduction" -while recognizing the validity of such concerns she
forcefully states the necessity for a feminist praxis to maintain a global
perspective and to forge cross-culhlral links without denying the reality of
differences that do exist. Consequently, the outright rejection of any theoretical framework because of its Western connections is viewed as an rumecessary limitation imposed upon feminism. Instead she proposes a strategic use
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of available resources that is constantly self-reflexive. Her use of Scarry's
work illustrates this strategy by presenting a constant critique of the theoretical model even as it is used as a basis for further analysis. While appropriating the concept of a politics of pain from Scarry, Sunder Rajan questions the
validity of representing pain as inarticulate which denies its potential for resistance. Furthermore, she recognizes that Scarry's book is caught in the classic orientalist bind of viewing the First World as the liberator and the Third
World as victim. Her use of this work, even as she reveals its ethnocentric
biases, makes her analysis itself an embodiment of the resisting subject.
Sunder Rajan's desire for a global feminist perspective is also evident in
her cross-cultural selection of texts to be analyzed. Her chapter on rape and
narrative representation draws upon the works of Richardson, Forster, Angelou, and Walker, along with both literary texts and fiims by Indian artists.
The resisting subject here is seen in terms of narrative strategies that focus,
in the texts by women, on the post-rape subjectivity of the woman. Such narratives present a direct contrast to the canonical First World textual representations of rape (in the characters of Clarissa and Adela Quested) that make
rape the climax of the novel after which the woman's subjectivity is gradually allowed to fade away. The women's texts deny the act of rape this determining role in the constitution of women's subjectivity and thus challenge
the fetishization of women as victims.
Sunder Rajan, however, does not present these women's texts as sites of
resistance that exist outside, and in opposition to, the cultural field that includes Richardson and Forster. Wary of privileging a discourse of resistance
that totally appropriates the cultural text-a danger thaI she perceives in
Lalitha and Tharu's Women Writing in India-Sunder Rajan is careful to point
out caste and class issues that compromise the oppOSitional force of these
texts. lnterestingly, though careful in the analysis of particular texts to avoid
their appropriation for any single political agenda of her own, Sunder Rajan
does not hesitate to use homogenizing categories such as "pre-colonial," "colonial," and "postcolonial" in her theoretical analysis. The practical dictates
of language do, to a certain extent, explain the necessity for some such
usages, but in a self-conscious theoretical work the unquestioning use of a
term like "postcolonial," and references to an undefined "pre-colonial" period in Indian history, cause moments of concern that could easily be
avoided by the addition of a few footnotes.
A more serious cause of concern is found in the discussion of women and
politics which makes the reader question the theoretical framework speCially
constructed by the author for this work. In general terms I find this chapter
to be one of the least inspiring sections of the book since it contains large
sections where summaries of previous work done in the field are left to
stand on their own with little or no additional analysis by the author. The
exclusive emphasis on the figure of Indira Gandhi in the title of the chapter
as well as in certain sections of the text that provide her biographical details
is misleading since the chapter does not in the final instance provide any significant analysis of her political career. The speCificity of Indira Gandhi is
subsumed by the category of "elite women in politics." A consideration of
the latter issue is in itself an important topic of discussion but the author
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fails to successfully integrate the particular with the general in the organization of this chapter.
The high point of this chapter is the use of Jacqueline Rose's analysis of
the place of women writers in feminist criticism as a means of highlighting
certain anomalies in the situation of elite women in politics. The categories
of the literary and the political are not collapsed, but a very fruitful parallel
is drawn between the largely "unrepresentative" quality of both women
writers and women leaders vis-it-vis the majority of women who inhabit a
comparatively subaltern position in society. Insead, true representation is
found in the concept of the "collective," and this leads Sunder Rajan to a discussion of the role of women in the local panchayats of the villages of India.
Interestingly, the resisting subject in this chapter is presented not in terms of
any text of cultural representation but rather as a case study of Viiner, a
small village in Maharastra. There is no reference in the text of the chapter to
the sources for this sociopolitical information (which are listed in the footnotes), and consequently, it appears to stand unrnediated through any form
of textual representation-a form of presentation that is found only in this
chapter focusing on politics. This significant departure from her usual strategies of cultural analysis, combined with her assertion that questions concerning political power are more "morally vexed" than those of literary creation,

appears to resurrect a hierarchical relationship of mutual exclusion between
the terms "real" and "imaginary" that is so carefully deconstructed throughout the rest of the book.
The theoretical and analytical confusion created by this chapter, however,
does not seriously compromise the critical significance of the work as a
whole. Chapters such as the one on dowry deaths and the final one on the
representation of the "new woman" in India embody the greatest strengths
of this book. Through a brilliant deconstructive strategy Sunder Rajan undermines the speech/ silence opposition by revealing how either of these can be
used for both oppression and resistance. The political connotations of the silenced subaltern are challenged by the use of authorial silence in works such
as Anuradha Ramanan's "The Embrace" where the ambiguity thus generated is potentially subversive. Similarly, the privileged position of speech in
terms of individual expression and subjectivity is significantly undermined
by speech acts such as the dying declarations of burnt wives who acquit
their husbands of all blame. Sunder Rajan then proposes "action" as an arena
of resistance for the silenced gendered subaltern. However, as the analysis of
the film Khoon Bhari Maang illustrates, the representation of "action" is also
circumscribed by oppressive ideological manipulations. Action, therefore, is
not presented as a "purer" form of resistance than speech. Rather, II action"

acts like the third point on a triangle that places the speech/silence dichotomy under erasure and expands the scope for a consideration of reSisting
subjectivi ties.
The final chapter is primarily concerned with the opposition between tradition and modernity that provides the framework for media representations
of the "new woman" in India. These "imaginary" constructions of women's

subjectivity soft-peddle the historical specificity and complexity of these opposing demands on women by presenting images of effortless reconciliation
where the "modem" is seen as a Simple extension of the "traditional." As the
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idea of women's liberation is embodied in a line of figures stretching from
Draupadi to Laxmibai, the need for a contemporary feminist movement is
made redundant. At the same time, the focus of state policies and journalistic coverage on "women's issues" further limits any space for an autonomous feminist consciousness founded upon female agency. Such a siege of
feminism requires a feminist project that provides conceptual alternatives to
these "imaginary" constructions which represent women's autonomy within
a viable social structure. Sunder Rajan locates such representations of "real"
women in self-consciously feminist texts engaging with the complexity of a
social reality that makes women both conflicting subjects and sites of conflict," and presenting modes of resistance rooted in this reality. The "real"
nature of these cultural representations, as opposed to the "imaginary" character of mass media representations, is seen as a function of their engagement with the material reality of historical contingency and social complexity rather than any claims of ideological neutrality.
Real and Imagined Women may contain conceptual ambiguities that, at
times, weaken its interpretative framework, but its overall project of presenting a theoretical perspective on postcolonial feminism rooted in cultural
analysis is deftly executed, which makes it an essential read for scholars engaged in debates regarding postcolonialism and cultural studies. Sunder Rajan has made a notable contribution to these fields not only through the brilliant insights provided by her readings of the individual texts, but also
through her use of challenging new strategies of cross-cultural analysis that
will prove to be indispensable for further work in the area of postcolonial
feminism. Intellectally stimulating and politically empowering, this work of
Indian feminism is an important bridge between feminist scholars working
in the "First" and the "Third" world.
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